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1 Introduction
Despite its widespread acceptance, there are some problems in using proba-
bility to represent uncertainty. Perhaps the most serious is that probability
is not good at representing ignorance. The following two examples illustrate
the problem.
Example 1.1: Suppose that a coin is tossed once. There are two possible
worlds, h and t, corresponding to the two possible outcomes. If the coin is
known to be fair, it seems reasonable to assign probability 1/2 to each of
these worlds. However, suppose that the coin has an unknown bias (where
the bias of a coin is the probability that it lands heads.) How should this be
∗The material in this chapter is taken, often verbatim, from [Halpern 2003], which the
reader is encouraged to consult for further details and references.
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represented? One approach might be to continue to take heads and tails as
the elementary outcomes and, applying the principle of indifference, assign
them both probability 1/2, just as in the case of a fair coin. However, there
seems to be a significant qualitative difference between a fair coin and a coin
of unknown bias. This difference has some pragmatic consequences. For ex-
ample, as Kyburg (e.g., in [Kyburg 1961]) has pointed out, the assumption
that heads and tails have probability 1/2, together with the assumption that
consecutive coin tosses are independent implies that, if the coin is tossed
1,000,000 times, then the probability that the coin will land heads some-
where between 498,000 and 502,000 times is greater than .999. This certainly
doesn’t seem something that an agent who has no idea of the bias of the coin
should know!
Example 1.2: Suppose that a bag contains 100 marbles; 30 are known to
be red, and the remainder are known to be either blue or yellow, although
the exact proportion of blue and yellow is not known. What is the likelihood
that a marble taken out of the bag is yellow? This can be modeled with three
possible worlds, red, blue, and yellow, one for each of the possible outcomes.
It seems reasonable to assign probability .3 to the outcome to choosing a red
marble, and thus probability .7 to choosing either blue or yellow, but what
probability should be assigned to the other two outcomes?
Empirically, it is clear that people do not use probability to represent the
uncertainty in this example. For example, consider the following three bets.
In each case a marble is chosen from the bag.
• Br pays $1 if the marble is red, and 0 otherwise;
• Bb pays $1 if the marble is blue, and 0 otherwise;
• By pays $1 if the marble is yellow, and 0 otherwise.
People invariably prefer Br to both Bb and By, and they are indifferent
between Bb and By. The fact that they are indifferent between Bb ad By
suggests that they view it equally likely that the marble chosen is blue and
that it is yellow. This seems reasonable; the problem statement provides no
reason to prefer blue to yellow, or vice versa. However, if the probability of
drawing a red marble is taken to be .3, then the probability of drawing a blue
marble and that of drawing a yellow marble are both .35, which suggests that
By and Bb should both be preferred to Br.
Moreover, now consider the following three bets:
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• Bry pays $1 if the marble is red or yellow, and 0 otherwise;
• Bby pays $1 if the marble is blue or yellow, and 0 otherwise.
While most people prefer Br to Bb, most also prefer Bby to Bry. There is no
probability measure on {b, r, y} that would both make b more likely than r
and make {b, r} less likely than {b, y}. (This is essentially Ellsberg’s [1961]
paradox; I return to this issue in Section 7.)
One natural way of representing uncertainty in both of these cases is
by using a set of probability measures, rather than a single measure. For
example, the uncertainty in Example 1.1 can be represented by the set
Pm = {µa : a ∈ [0, 1]} of probability measures on {h, t}, where µa gives
h probability a. In Example 1.2, the uncertainty can be represented using
the set Pu = {µ
′
a : a ∈ [0, .7]} of probability measures on {red, blue, yellow},
where µ′a gives red probability .3, blue probability a, and yellow probability
.7− a.
In the rest of this paper, I explore the use of sets of probability measures
as a representation of uncertainty.
2 Lower and Upper Probability and Dutch
Book Arguments
Let P be a set of probability measures all defined on all subsets of a finite
set W of possible worlds.1 Given a set X of real numbers, let supX, the
supremum (or just sup) of X, be the least upper bound of X—the smallest
real number that is at least as large as all the elements in X . That is,
supX = α if x ≤ α for all x ∈ X and if, for all α′ < α, there is some x ∈ X
such that x > α′. For example, if X = {1/2, 3/4, 7/8, 15/16, . . .}, then
supX = 1. Similarly, infX, the infimum (or just inf ) of X , is the greatest
lower bound of X—the largest real number that is less than or equal to every
element in X . For U ⊆W, define
P(U) = {µ(U) : µ ∈ P},
P∗(U) = inf P(U), and
P∗(U) = supP(U).
1The assumptions that W is finite and that every subset of W is measurable, that is,
in the domain of every probability measure µ ∈ P , are made for ease of exposition only.
They can both easily be dropped.
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P∗(U) is called the lower probability of U, and P
∗(U) is called the upper
probability of U . If P∗(U) = P∗(U) for all subsets U of W , then it is easy
to see that P must be a singleton {µ}, and P∗ = P∗ = µ. In general, of
course, P∗ 6= P∗. For a set U , the difference P
∗(U)−P∗(U) can be viewed as
characterizing our ignorance about U . In Example 1.2, there is uncertainty
about the likelihood of red being chosen, but there is no ignorance: the
likelihood is exactly .3. This is captured by P2: (P2)∗(red) = (P2)
∗(red) =
.3. On the other hand, there is ignorance about the likelihood of blue and
yellow being chosen. And, indeed, (P2)∗(blue) = 0 and (P2)
∗(blue) = .7, and
similarly for yellow.
While lower and upper probabilities seem natural, how reasonable is it to
use them to represent uncertainty? I investigate this question in a number of
different contexts in the next few sections. For now, I briefly consider one of
the most prominent justifications for probability, the Dutch book argument,
which goes back to Ramsey [1931] and de Finetti [1931, 1937], and see how
it fares in the context of sets of probabilities.
Roughly speaking, the Dutch book argument says that if odds do not act
like probabilities, then there is a collection of bets that guarantees a sure
loss. Somewhat more precisely, suppose that an agent must post odds for
each subset of a set W . If the agent chooses odds of, say, 4:5 on U ⊆ W ,
then this is supposed to mean that the agent is willing to accept a bet of any
size for or against U . If a bookie bets $k on U , then if U happens (i.e., if
the actual world is in U—it is assumed that this can always be determined),
then the bookie wins $9/4k; if not, the bookie loses the $k. Similarly, if
the bookie bets $k against U , then if the U happens, the bookie loses the
$k, and if not, then the bookie wins $9/5k. In general, if the odds for U
are o1 : o2, then if a bookie bets $k on U , then he wins (o1 + o2)/o1 if U
happens and loses the $k otherwise, and if he bets against U , he loses $k if
U happens and wins (o1 + o2)/o2 otherwise. If the odds on U are o1 : o2, let
pU be o1/(o1 + o2). The key claim is that, unless the numbers pU act like
probabilities (and, in particular, pW = 1 and pU∪V = pU + pV if U and V are
disjoint), then the agent is irrational: there is a Dutch book, a collection of
bets which guarantee a loss for the agent. Conversely, if the pU ’s do act like
probabilities, then there is no Dutch book.
Does this mean it is irrational to use other representations of uncertainty,
such as sets of probability measures? Many problems have been noted with
Dutch book arguments (see, for example, [Howson and Urbach 1989, pp. 89–
91], [Hajek 2007]). Of most relevance here is the implicit assumption that
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an agent can or is willing to post fair odds, that is, odds for which he is
indifferent between a bet for and against a subset U of W . In the stock
market, bid and ask prices are not necessarily equal. Suppose that instead of
posting fair odds, the agent were only willing to post the analogue of bid and
ask prices; odds for which he is willing to take a bet on U and (lower) odds at
which he is willing to take a bet against U . In that case, arguments similar
in spirit to those used by de Finetti and Ramsey can be used to show that
the agent is rational iff his odds determine lower and upper probabilities (see
[Smith 1961; Williams 1976]). The key to making these arguments precise is
a characterization of lower and upper probabilities, which is the subject of
the next section.
3 Charaterizing Lower and Upper Probabil-
ity
A probability measure on W is a function µ : 2W → [0, 1] characterized by
two well-known properties:
P1. µ(W ) = 1.
P2. µ(U1 ∪ U2) = µ(U1) + µ(U2) if U1 and U2 are disjoint subsets of W .
Every probability measure satisfies P1 and P2, and every function from µ :
2W → [0, 1] satisfying P1 and P2 is a probability measure. Property P2 is
known as (finite) additivity ; note that the fact that µ(∅) = 0 follows easily
from P2; P1 and P2 together imply that µ(U) = 1− µ(U).
Are there similar properties characterizing lower and upper probabilities?
It is easy to see that P1 continues to hold for both lower and upper proba-
bilities. P2 does not hold, but lower probability is superadditive and upper
probability is subadditive, so that for disjoint sets U and V,
P∗(U ∪ V ) ≥ P∗(U) + P∗(V ), and
P∗(U ∪ V ) ≤ P∗(U) + P∗(V ).
(1)
In addition, the relationship between lower and upper probability is defined
by
P∗(U) = 1− P
∗(U). (2)
(I leave the straightforward proof of these results to the reader.)
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While (1) and (2) hold for all lower and upper probabilities, these proper-
ties do not completely characterize them. For example, the following property
holds for lower and upper probabilities if U and V are disjoint:
P∗(U ∪ V ) ≤ P∗(U) + P
∗(V ) ≤ P∗(U ∪ V ); (3)
moreover, (3) does not follow from (1) and (2) [Halpern and Pucella 2002a].
However, even adding (3) to (1) and (2) does not provide a complete char-
acterization of lower and upper probabilities. The property needed to get
a complete characterization is somewhat complex. To state it precisely, say
that a set U of subsets of W covers a subset U of W exactly k times if every
element of U is in exactly k sets in U . Consider the following property:
If U = {U1, . . . , Uk} covers U exactly m+ n times and covers U
exactly m times, then
∑k
i=1P∗(Ui) ≤ m+ nP∗(U).
(4)
(There is of course an analogous property for upper probability, with ≤
replaced by ≥.) It is not hard to show that lower probabilities satisfy (4) and
that (1) and (3) follow from (4) and (2). Indeed, in a precise sense, as Anger
and Lembcke [1985] show, (4) completely characterizes lower probabilities
(and hence, together with (2), upper probabilities as well).
Theorem 3.1: [Anger and Lembcke 1985] Lower probability satisfies (4).
Conversely, if f : 2W → [0, 1] satisfies (4) (with P∗ replaced by f) and
f(W ) = 1, then there exists a set P of probability measures such that f = P∗.
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Although I have been focusing on lower and upper probability, it is impor-
tant to stress that sets of probability measures contain more information than
is captured by their lower and upper probability, as the following example
shows.
Example 3.2: Consider two variants of Example 1.2. In the first, all that
is known is that there are at most 50 yellow marbles and at most 50 blue
marbles in a bag of 100 marbles; no information at all is given about the
number of red marbles. In the second case, it is known that there are exactly
2Besides the characterization of Anger and Lembcke given in Theorem 3.1, a number
of other characterizations of lower and upper probability have been given in the literature,
all similar in spirit [Giles 1982; Huber 1976; Huber 1981; Lorentz 1952; Williams 1976;
Wolf 1977].
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as many blue marbles as yellow marbles. The first situation can be captured
by the set P3 = {µ : µ(blue) ≤ .5, µ(yellow) ≤ .5}. The second situation can
be captured by the set P4 = {µ : µ(b) = µ(y)}. These sets of measures are
obviously quite different; in fact P4 is a strict subset of P3. However, it is
easy to see that (P3)∗ = (P4)∗ and, hence, that P
∗
3 = P
∗
4 . Thus, the fact
that blue and yellow have equal probability in every measure in P4 has been
lost by considering only lower and upper probability. I return to this issue
in Section 6.
4 Dempster-Shafer Belief Functions as Lower
Probabilities
The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence, originally introduced by Arthur
Dempster [1967, 1968] and then developed by Glenn Shafer [1976], provides
another approach to attaching likelihoods to events. This approach starts
out with a belief function (sometimes called a support function). Given a
set W of possible worlds and U ⊆ W, the belief in U, denoted Bel(U), is a
number in the interval [0, 1]. A belief function Bel defined on a space W
must satisfy the following three properties:
B1. Bel(∅) = 0.
B2. Bel(W ) = 1.
B3. Bel(∪ni=1Ui) ≥
∑n
i=1
∑
{I⊆{1,...,n}:|I|=i}(−1)
i+1Bel(∩j∈IUj), for n = 1, 2, 3, . . ..
B1 and B2 just say that, like probability measures, belief functions follow
the convention of using 0 and 1 to denote the minimum and maximum like-
lihood. B3 is closely related to the inclusion-exclusion rule for probability.
The inclusion-exclusion rule is used to compute the probability of the union
of (not necessarily disjoint) sets. In the case of two sets U and V , the rule
says
µ(U ∪ V ) = µ(U) + µ(V )− µ(U ∩ V ).
In the case of three sets U1, U2, U3, similar arguments show that
µ(U1 ∪ U2 ∪ U3) =
µ(U1) + µ(U2) + µ(U3)− µ(U1 ∩ U2)− µ(U1 ∩ U3)− µ(U2 ∩ U3) + µ(U1 ∩ U2 ∩ U3).
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That is, the probability of the union of U1, U2, and U3 can be determined
by adding the probability of the individual sets (these are one-way intersec-
tions), subtracting the probability of the two-way intersections, and adding
the probability of the three-way intersections. The generalization of this rule
to k sets, with = replaced by ≥, is just B3. It follows that every probability
measure is a belief function.
If U and V are disjoint sets, then it easily follows from B1 and B3 that
Bel(U ∪ V ) ≥ Bel(U) + Bel(V ). That is, Bel is superadditive, just like a
lower probability. And just like a lower probability, Bel(U) can be viewed
as providing a lower bound on the likelihood of U . Define Plaus(U) = 1 −
Bel(U). Plaus is a plausibility function; Plaus(U) is the plausibility of U .
A plausibility function bears the same relationship to a belief function that
upper probability bears to lower probability.
By B2 and B3, for all subsets U ⊆ W , 1 = Bel(W ) ≥ Bel(U) + Bel(U),
so
Plaus(U) = 1− Bel(U) ≥ Bel(U).
Thus, for an event U, the interval [Bel(U),Plaus(U)] can be viewed as describ-
ing the range of possible values of the likelihood of U , just like [P∗(U),P
∗(U)].
There is in fact a deeper connection between belief functions and lower
probabilities: every belief function is a lower probability and the correspond-
ing plausibilty function is the corresponding upper probability.
Theorem 4.1: Given a belief function Bel defined on a space W, let PBel =
{µ : µ(U) ≥ Bel(U) for all U ⊆ W}. Then Bel = (PBel)∗ and Plaus =
(PBel)
∗.
The converse of Theorem 4.1 does not follow, as the following example
shows.
Example 4.2: Suppose thatW = {a, b, c, d}, P = {µ1, µ2}, µ1(a) = µ1(b) =
µ1(c) = µ1(d) = 1/4, and µ2(a) = µ2(c) = 1/2 (so that µ2(b) = µ2(d) = 0).
Let U1 = {a, b} and U2 = {b, c}. It is easy to check that P∗(U1) = P∗(U2) =
1/2, P∗(U1 ∪ U2) = 3/4, and P∗(U1 ∩ U2) = 0. P∗ thus cannot be a belief
function, because it violates B3:
P∗(U1 ∪ U2) < P∗(U1) + P∗(U2)− P∗(U1 ∩ U2).
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Thus, lower probabilities are a strictly more expressive representation of
uncertainty than belief functions.
I remark that while belief functions can be understood (to some extent)
in terms of lower probability, this is not the only way of understanding them.
Shafer, for example, views belief functions as a way of representing evidence;
see [Halpern and Fagin 1992] for a discussion of these two ways of under-
standing belief functions.
5 Updating Sets of Probabilities
Suppose that an agent’s uncertainty is defined in terms of a set P of proba-
bility measures. How should the agent update his beliefs in light of observing
an event U? The obvious thing to do is to condition each member of P on
U . This suggests that after observing U, the agent’s uncertainty should be
represented by the set {µ|U : µ ∈ P} (where µ|U is the conditional probabil-
ity measure that results by conditioning µ on U). There is one obvious issue
that needs to be addressed: What happens if µ(U) = 0 for some µ ∈ P?
There are two choices here: either to say that conditioning makes sense only
if µ(U) > 0 for all µ ∈ P (i.e., if P∗(U) > 0) or to consider only those mea-
sures µ for which µ(U) > 0. The latter choice is somewhat more general, so
that is what I use here. Thus, I define
P|U = {µ|U : µ ∈ P, µ(U) > 0}.
Once the agent has a set P|U of conditional probability measures, it is pos-
sible to consider lower and upper conditional probabilities. However, note
that the lower and upper conditional probabilities are not determined by the
lower and upper probabilities, as the following example shows.
Example 5.1: Let P3 and P4 be the sets of probability measures constructed
in Example 3.2. As was already observed, (P3)∗ = (P4)∗ (and so (P3)
∗ =
(P4)
∗). But (P3)∗(b | {b, y}) = 0, while (P4)∗(b | {b, y}) = 1/2. Thus,
even though the upper and lower probability determined by P3 and P4 are
the same, the upper and lower probabilities determined by P3|{b, y} and
P4|{b, y} are not.
The following example gives a sense of how conditioning works with sets
of probabilities.
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Example 5.2: The three-prisoners is the following old puzzle, which is dis-
cussed, for example, by Mosteller [1965] and Gardner [1961]:
One of three prisoners, a, b, and c, has been chosen by a fair
lottery to be pardoned, while the other two will be executed.
Prisoner a does not know who has been pardoned; the jailer does.
Thus, a says to the jailer, “Since either b or c is certainly going
to be executed, you will give me no information about my own
chances if you give me the name of one man, either b or c, who
is going to be executed.” Accepting this argument, the jailer
truthfully replies, “b will be executed.” Thereupon a feels happier
because before the jailer replied, his own chance of execution was
2/3, but afterward there are only two people, himself and c, who
could be the one not executed, and so his chance of execution is
1/2.
It seems that the jailer did not give a any new relevant information. Is a
justified in believing that his chances of avoiding execution have improved?
If so, it seems that a would be equally justified in believing that his chances
of avoiding execution would have improved if the jailer had said “c will be
executed.” Thus, it seems that a’s prospects improve no matter what the
jailer says! That does not seem quite right.
Conditioning is implicitly being applied here to a space consisting of three
worlds—say wa, wb, and wc—where in world wx, prisoner x is pardoned. But
this representation of a world does not take into account what the jailer
says. A better representation of a possible situation is as a pair (x, y), where
x, y ∈ {a, b, c}. Intuitively, a pair (x, y) represents a situation where x is par-
doned and the jailer says that y will be executed in response to a’s question.
Since the jailer answers truthfully, x 6= y; since the jailer will never tell a
directly that a will be executed, y 6= a. Thus, the set of possible worlds is
{(a, b), (a, c), (b, c), (c, b)}. The event lives-a—a lives—corresponds to the set
{(a, b), (a, c)}. Similarly, the events lives-b and lives-c correspond to the sets
{(b, c)} and {(c, b)}, respectively. By assumption, each prisoner is equally
likely to be pardoned, so that each of these three events has probability 1/3.
The event says-b—the jailer says b—corresponds to the set {(a, b), (c, b)};
the story does not give a probability for this event. The event {(c, b)} (lives-
c) has probability 1/3. But what is the probability of {(a, b)}? That depends
on the jailer’s strategy in the one case where he has a choice, namely, when a
lives. He gets to choose between saying b and c in that case. The probability
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of (a, b) depends on the probability that he says b if a lives; that is, on
µ(says-b | lives-a).
If the jailer chooses at random between saying b and c if a is pardoned,
so that µ(says-b | lives-a) = 1/2, then µ({(a, b)}) = µ({(a, c)}) = 1/6, and
µ(says-b) = 1/2. With this assumption,
µ(lives-a | says-b) = µ(lives-a ∩ says-b)/µ(says-b) = (1/6)/(1/2) = 1/3.
Thus, if µ(says-b) = 1/2, the jailer’s answer does not affect a’s probability.
Suppose more generally that µα, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, is the probability measure
such that µα(lives-a) = µα(lives-b) = µα(lives-c) = 1/3 and µα(says-b |
lives-a) = α. Then straightforward computations show that
µα({(a, b)}) = µα(lives-a)× µα(says-b | lives-a) = α/3,
µα(says-b) = µα({(a, b)}) + µα({(c, b)}) = (α + 1)/3, and
µα(lives-a | says-b) =
α/3
(α+1)/3
= α/(α+ 1).
Thus, µ1/2 = µ. Moreover, if α 6= 1/2 (i.e., if the jailer had a particular
preference for answering either b or c when a was the one pardoned), then
a’s probability of being executed would change, depending on the answer.
For example, if α = 0, then if a is pardoned, the jailer will definitely say
c. Thus, if the jailer actually says b, then a knows that he is definitely not
pardoned, that is, µ0(lives-a | says-b) = 0. Similarly, if α = 1, then a knows
that if either he or c is pardoned, then the jailer will say b, while if b is
pardoned the jailer will say c. Given that the jailer says b, from a’s point
of view the one pardoned is equally likely to be him or c; thus, µ1(lives-a |
says-b) = 1/2. In fact, it is easy to see that if PJ = {µα : α ∈ [0, 1]}, then
(PJ |says-b)∗(lives-a) = 0 and (PJ |says-b)
∗(lives-a) = 1/2.
To summarize, the intuitive answer—that the jailer’s answer gives a no
information—is correct if the jailer applies the principle of indifference in the
one case where he has a choice in what to say, namely, when a is actually
the one to live. If the jailer does not apply the principle of indifference in
this case, then a may gain information. On the other hand, if a does not
know what strategy the jailer is using to answer (and is not willing to place a
probability on these strategies), then his prior point probability of 1/3 dilates
to the interval [0, 1/2].
As Seidenfeld andWasserman [1993] have shown, the dilation phenomenon
observed in this example, where the prisoner’s ignorance after hearing the
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jailer’s answer goes from 0—initially a knew that the probability of him being
executed was 1/3—to 1/2, no matter what the jailer says, is quite general.
Nevertheless, it is easy to see where the dilation is coming from here, and
it is arguably acceptable. (Although, as shown by Gru¨nwald and Halpern
[2004], there may be circumstances when working with sets of probabilities
under which it is most appropriate to ignore new information and just work
with the prior probability.) A perhaps more significant problem with this
approach to conditioning on sets of probabilities is that it does not always
seem to capture learning, as the following example shows.
Example 5.3: Suppose that a coin is tossed twice and the first coin toss
is observed to land heads. What is the likelihood that the second coin toss
lands heads? In this situation, the sample space consists of four worlds:
hh, ht, th, and tt. Let H1 = {hh, ht} be the event that the first coin toss
lands heads. There are analogous events H2, T 1, and T 2. Further suppose
that all that is known about the coin is that its bias is either a or b, where
0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1. The most obvious way to represent this seems to be with
a set of probability measures P = {µa, µb}.
3 Further suppose that the coin
tosses are independent, so that, in particular, µα(hh) = µα(H
1)µα(H
2) = α2
and that µα(ht) = µα(H
1)µα(T
2) = α− α2 for α ∈ {a, b}.
Using the definitions, it is immediate that P|H1(H2) = {a, b} = P(H2).
At first blush, this seems reasonable. Since the coin tosses are independent,
observing heads on the first toss does not affect the likelihood of heads on
the second toss; it is either a or b, depending on what the actual bias of the
coin is. However, intuitively, observing heads on the first toss should also
give information about the coin being used: it is more likely to be the coin
with bias b. This point perhaps comes out more clearly if a = 1/3, b = 2/3,
the coin is tossed 100 times, and 66 heads are observed in the first 99 tosses.
What is the probability of heads on the hundredth toss? Formally, using the
obvious notation, the question now is what P|(H1 ∩ . . .∩H99)(H100) should
be. According to the definitions, it is again {1/3, 2/3}: the probability is
still either 1/3 or 2/3, depending on the coin used. But the fact that 66 of
3Some researchers working with probability restrict to sets P of probability measures
that are convex. That is, if µ and µ′ are both in P , then so is the probability measure
αµ+(1−α)µ′ for all α in the interval [0, 1] (where (αµ+(1−α)µ′)(U) = αµ(U)+(1−α)µ′; it
is easy to check that αµ+(1−α)µ′ is a probability measure). I do not make this restriction
here, but it is worth noting that nothing would be lost in this example by taking P to be
the convex set consisting of all probability meausures µ such that a ≤ µ(h) ≤ b.
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99 tosses landed heads provides extremely strong evidence that the coin has
bias 2/3 rather than 1/3. This evidence should make it more likely that the
probability that the last coin will land heads is 2/3 rather than 1/3. The
conditioning process does not capture this evidence at all.
The inability of this approach to conditioning with sets of probabilities to
capture learning is perhaps its most serious weakness. Note that this really
is a problem confined to sets of probabilities. If there is a probability on the
possible biases of the coin, then all these difficulties disappear. In this case,
the sample space must represent the possible biases of the coin, so there are
eight worlds: (a, hh), (β, hh), (a, ht), (β, ht), . . .. Moreover, if the probability
that it has bias a is p (so that the probability that it has bias β is 1 − p),
then the uncertainty is captured by a single probability measure µ such that
µ(a, hh) = pa2, µ(β, hh) = (1−p)b2, and so on. A straightforward calculation
shows that µ(H1) = µ(H2) = pa+(1−p)b and µ(H1∩H2) = pa2+(1−p)b2,
so µ(H2 | H1) = (pa2 + (1− p)b2)/(pa + (1− p)b). With a little calculus, it
can be shown that µ(H2 | H1) = (pa2 + (1− p)b2)/(pa+ (1− p)b) ≥ µ(H2),
no matter what a and b are, with equality holding iff a = 0 or a = 1.
Intuitively, seeing H1 makes H2 more likely than it was before, despite the
fact the coin tosses are independent, because seeing H2 makes the coin more
biased towards heads more likely to be the actual coin. This intuition can be
formalized in a straightforward way. Let Cb be the event that the coin has bias
b (so that Cb consists of the four worlds of the form (b, . . .)). Then µ(Cb) =
1−p by assumption, while µ(Cb | H
1) = (1−p)b/(pa+(1−p)b) ≥ 1−p, with
equality holding iff p is either 0 or 1 (since otherwise b/(pa− (1− p)b) > 1).
Similarly, if µ(H2 | H1) ≥ µ(H2), with equality holding iff p is either 0 or 1.
Interestingly, if the bias of the coin is either 0 or 1 (i.e., the coin is either
double-tailed or double-headed, so that a = 0 and b = 1), then the evidence
is taken into account. In this case, after seeing heads, µ0 is eliminated, so
P|H1(H2) = 1 (or, more precisely, {1}), not {0, 1}. On the other hand, if the
bias is almost 0 or almost 1, say .005 or .995, then P|H1(H2) = {.005, .995}.
Thus, although the evidence is taken into account in the extreme case, where
the probability of heads is either 0 or 1, it is not taken into account if the
probability of heads is either slightly greater than 0 or slightly less than 1.
This observation suggests a modification of the conditioning process that
lets us capture learning. In Example 5.3, the implicit assumption is that
there is a true bias of the coin, either a or b, which the agent would like
to learn. Given an observation, the maximum likelihood approach, which
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is standard in statistics, would essentially use the probability measure that
gave the highest probability to the observation from then on. Since a < b
by assumption, after observing heads, we would use µb for making future
predictions, while after observing tails, we would use µa.
The conditioning approach considered so far uses all probability measures
except those that give probability 0 to the observation. An intermediate
approach between these extremes is to consider only probability distributions
that are within some parameter q of the maximum probability that U gets.
Formally, for 0 < q ≤ 1, define
Pq|U = {µ|U : µ ∈ P, qP ∗(U) ≤ µ(U)}.
The maximum likelihood approach is a special case of this approach with
q = 1. P|U as defined earlier, is essentially the case where q = 0, except that
≤ is replaced by <.
Intuitively, q can be viewed as describing how “conservative” the agent is;
the smaller q is, the more conservative the agent. Note that, for any choice
of q, learning takes place. For example, if we take P to consist of all the
probability measures µa with a ∈ [1/3, 2/3] (so that the agent considers the
bias of the coin to be somewhere between 1/3 and 2/3), and the true bias is
b ∈ [1/3, 2/3], then for any choice of q and ǫ, the agent will (with extremely
high probability) converge to considering possible only distributions µc with
c ∈ [b − ǫ, b + ǫ]. The larger q is, the faster the learning (but the greater
the likelihood of making mistakes by perhaps ignoring a probability measure
inappropriately).4
6 Lower and Upper Expectation
In the context of probability and betting games, how much an agent can
expect to win is defined in terms of expectation.
A gamble X on W is a function from W to the reals.5 As is standard in
the literature, if x is a real number, take X = x to be the subset of W which
X maps to x, that is, X = x is the subset {w : X(w) = x}.
4Although the idea of using a parameter q to do the updating is quite natural, I have
seen it in print only in the work of Epstein and Schneider [2005], who use it in the context
of decision making.
5A gamble is just a random variable whose range is the reals.
14
The expected value of X with repect to probability measure µ, denoted
Eµ(X), is just ∑
x
xµ(X = x).
For example, suppose that the agent bets $1 and will win $3 if U happens
and lose his dollar if U does not happen. We can characterize this bet by the
gamble B = 5XU −XU , where, for an arbitrary subset V of W , XV (w) = 1
if w ∈ V and XV (w) = 0 if w /∈ U . (XV is called the indicator function for
V .)
If µ(U) = 1/3, then the agent expects to win $5 with probability 1/3,
and to lose $1 with probability 2/3. The expected value of this bet is
Eµ(B) =
1
3
× 5 +
2
3
× (−1) = 1.
This seems like an intuitively reasonable characterization of the agent’s ex-
pected winnings, provided that his uncertainty is given by the probability
measure µ.
Probabilistic expectation is characterized by some well-known properties.
To make them precise, if X and Y are gambles on W and a and b are
real numbers, define the gamble aX + bY on W in the obvious way: (aX +
bY )(w) = aX(w) + bY (w). Say that X ≤ Y if X(w) ≤ Y (w) for all w ∈ W .
Let c˜ denote the constant function that always returns c; that is, c˜(w) = c.
Proposition 6.1: The function Eµ has the following properties for all gam-
bles X and Y .
(a) Eµ is additive: Eµ(X + Y ) = Eµ(X) + Eµ(Y ).
(b) Eµ is affinely homogeneous: Eµ(aX+ b˜) = aEµ(X)+b for all a, b ∈ IR.
(c) Eµ is monotone: if X ≤ Y, then Eµ(X) ≤ Eµ(Y ).
The properties in Proposition 6.1 essentially characterize probabilistic
expectation.
Proposition 6.2: Suppose that E maps gambles on W to IR and E is ad-
ditive, affinely homogeneous, and monotone. Then there is a (necessarily
unique) probability measure µ on W such that E = Eµ.
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Now suppose that uncertainty is represented by a set P of probability mea-
sures, rather than a single probability measure. Define EP(X) = {Eµ(X) :
µ ∈ P}. EP(X) is a set of numbers. We can use EP to define obvious
analogues of lower and upper probability. Define the lower expectation and
upper expectation of X with respect to P, denoted EP(X) and EP(X), as
the inf and sup of the set EP(X), respectively.
Just as lower probability determines upper probability (and vice versa),
so lower expectation determines upper expectation. It is not hard to show
that
EP(X) = −EP(−X).
We can recover lower and upper probability from lower and upper expec-
tation. It is easy to check that EP(XU) = P∗(U) and EP(XU) = P
∗(U),
where XU is the indicator function for U defined earlier. The converse is
not true; lower and upper probability do not determine lower and upper
expectation.
Example 6.3: Again, consider the sets P3 and P4 of probability measures
defined in Example 3.2. As observed earlier, (P3)∗ = (P4)∗, and so (P3)
∗ =
(P4)
∗. However, if Y is the random variable X{b} − X{y}, then EP4(Y ) =
E(P4)(Y ) = 0 (since µ(b) = µ(y) for all probability measures in P4), while
EP3(Y ) = −1 and EP3(Y ) = 1.
Thus, lower (and upper) expectation can make finer distinctions than
lower and upper probability. (Note that this is not the case for probability: µ
determines Eµ and vice versa.) Morever, the lower expectation corresponding
to a set P of probability measures essentially determines P.
To make this precise, recall that a set P of probability measures on W
is convex if, for all µ, µ′ ∈ P and α ∈ [0, 1], the probability measure αµ +
(1 − α)µ′ is also in P. P is closed if it contains its limits. That is, for all
sequences µ1, µ2, . . . of probability measures in P, if µn → µ in the sense that
µn(U) → µ(U) for all U ⊆ W, then µ ∈ P. Let P denote the convex closure
of P; that is, P is the smallest closed convex set of probability measures
containing P. It is easy to see that EP = EP and EP = EP ; adding a
convex combinations of probability measure to P does not affect the lower
expectation, nor does closing off P under limits. The converse holds as well.
Theorem 6.4: EP1 = EP2 iff P1 = P2.
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Thus, there is a one-to-one map between closed, convex sets of probability
measures and lower expectation functions. This shows that lower expecta-
tions are essentially as good as sets of probability measures as representations
of uncertainty. Walley [1991] provides a detailed account of the use of lower
and upper expectations as a representation of uncertainty. (He calls them
coherent lower and upper previsions.)
Lower and upper expectation have a rather elegant characterization, sim-
ilar in spirit to (but simpler than) the characterization of lower and upper
probability. The following result collects some properties of lower and upper
expectation, all of which are easy to verify.
Proposition 6.5: The functions EP and EP have the following properties,
for all gambles X and Y .
(a) EP is subadditive: EP(X + Y ) ≤ EP(X) + EP(Y );
EP is superadditive: EP(X + Y ) ≥ EP(X) + EP(Y ).
(b) EP and EP are both positively affinely homogeneous: EP(aX + b˜) =
aEP(X) + b and EP(aX + b˜) = aEP(X) + b if a, b ∈ IR, a ≥ 0.
(c) EP and EP are monotone.
(d) EP(X) = −EP(−X).
Superadditivity (resp., subadditivity), positive affine homogeneity, and
monotonicity in fact characterize EP (resp., EP).
Theorem 6.6: [Huber 1981] Suppose that E maps gambles on W to IR
and is superadditive (resp., subadditive), positively affinely homogeneous, and
monotone. Then there is a set P of probability measures on W such that
E = EP (resp., E = EP).
The set P constructed in Theorem 6.6 is not unique. But it follows from
Theorem 6.4 that there is a unique closed convex set P such that E = EP .
P is actually the largest set of probability measures P ′ such that E = EP ′ ,
and consists of all probability measures µ such that Eµ(X) ≥ E(X) for all
gambles X .
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7 Decision Making
One of the standard uses of a representation of uncertainty is to help make
decisions. Savage [1954] formalizes the decision process by considering a set
W of possible worlds (sometimes called states), a set C of consequences,
and a set A of acts, which are functions from worlds to consequences. For
example, if an agent is trying to decide how to bet on a horse race, the
worlds could represent the order in which the horses finished the race, and
the consequences could be amounts of money won or lost. The consequence
of a bet of $10 on Northern Dancer depends on how Northern Dancer finishes
in the world. So the bet is an act that maps worlds (which describe possible
orders of finish) to consequences. The consequence could be purely monetary
(the agent wins $50 in the worlds where Northern Dancer wins the race) but
could also include feelings (the agent is dejected if Northern Dancer finishes
last, and he also loses $10).
Savage [1954] assumes that the agent has a preference order  on acts,
where a1  a2 means that a1 is at least as good as a2 from the point of
view of the agent. He shows that if the preference order satisfies certain
postulates, then the agent is acting as if she has a probability µ on worlds, a
utility function u mapping consequences to reals, and is maximizing expected
utility; that is, a1  a2 iff the expected utility of a1 is at least as high as the
expected utility of a2.
Savage viewed his postulates as rationality postulates; an agent would be
irrational if her preferences violated the postulates. However, as I discussed
earlier, in the situation described by Example 1.2, experimental evidence
(see [Kagel and Roth 1995]) shows that most people prefer the bet Br to Bb
and also prefers Bby to Bry. These preferences are inconsistent with Savage’s
postulates. Indeed, there does not exist a utility that can be placed on the
two possible consequences (getting $1 and getting 0) and a probability that
can be placed on {b, r, y} such that these preferences correspond to the order
induced by expected utility.
On the other hand, these preferences can be captured using lower ex-
pected utility, an approach considered by Wald [1950], Ga¨rdenfors and Sahlin
[1982], and Gilboa and Schmeidler [1989], among others. Taking the obvious
set Pu of probability measures described after Example 1.2 and giving utility
1 to winning $1 and utility 0 to getting 0, it is easy to see that the lower
expected utility of act Br is .3, the lower expected utility of act Bb is 0, the
lower expected utility of Bry is also .3, and the lower expected utility of Bby
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is .7. Thus, if the agent prefers the act whose lower expected utility is larger,
then she would indeed prefer Br to Bb and prefer Bby to Bry.
Gilboa and Schmeidler [1989] provide a collection of postulates that char-
acterize decision making with lower expected utility in the spirit of Savage’s
postulates. Of course, it is debatable whether these postulates represent “ra-
tionality” any better than Savage’s do. However, they do undercut the claim
that Savage’s postulate characterize rationality.
Using lower expected utility corresponds to the preference order 1P on
acts such that a 1P a
′ iff EP(ua) ≥ EP(ua′). But this is not the only
preference rule that can be used if uncertainty is represented using a set P
of probabilities. Other orders can be defined as well:
• a 2P a
′ iff EP(ua) ≥ EP(ua′);
• a 3P a
′ iff EP(ua) ≥ EP(ua′);
• a 4P a
′ iff Eµ(ua) ≥ Eµ(ua′) for all µ ∈ P.
Of course, all of these preference orders reduce to the order provided by
maximizing expected utility if P is a singleton. But in general they are quite
different. The order on acts induced by 3P is very conservative; a 
3
P a
′
iff the best expected outcome according to a is no better than the worst
expected outcome according to a′. The order induced by 4P is more refined.
Clearly if a 3P a
′, then Eµ(ua) ≥ Eµ(ua′) for all µ ∈ P, so a 
4
P a
′. The
converse may not hold. For example, suppose that P = {µ, µ′}, and acts a
and a′ are such that Eµ(ua) = 2, Eµ′(ua) = 4, Eµ(ua′) = 1, and Eµ′(ua′) = 3.
Then EP(ua) = 2, EP(ua) = 4, EP(ua′) = 1, and EP(ua′) = 3, so a and a
′
are incomparable according to 3P , yet a 
4
P a
′.
Which of these rules is the “right” one? We can think of 1P as rep-
resenting a very pessimistic agent (who considers only the worst case); 2P
represents an optimistic agent; while 4P represents an agent who considers
all possibilities. (I find 3P too conservative, and believe that 
4
P is a better
choice than 3P .) Note that while 
1
P and 
2
P place a total order on acts,
the ordering 4P is only partial; some acts will be incomparable under 
4
P .
8 Conclusion
I have provided a brief overview of some of the issues that arise when rep-
resenting uncertainty by sets of probabilities, with a particular focus on up-
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dating and decision making. Before concluding, I briefly mention two other
issues that may be of interest:
• There are propositional logics for reasoning about about probability
and Dempster-Shafer belief functions [Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo
1990]. More recently, logics have been provided for reasoning about
lower and upper probabilities [Halpern and Pucella 2002a] and lower
and upper expectations [Halpern and Pucella 2002b]. The syntax of
the logics for reasoning about probability, belief functions, and lower
and upper probability are all the same. All include statements such as
2/3l(ϕ) + 3/4l(ψ) ≥ 1/2, where ϕ and ψ are propositional formulas.
The “l” here stands for “likelihood”. Thus, this statement says 2/3
times the likelihood of ϕ plus 3/4 times the likelihood of ψ is at least
1/2. “Likelihood” can be interpreted as either probability, belief, or
lower probability. In the latter case, the upper probability of ϕ can be
expressed as 1− l(¬ϕ). (In the case of belief, the same formula defines
the plausibility of ϕ.)
The syntax for the logic of expectation is similar in spirit. It in-
cludes formulas of the form 2/3e(γ) + 3/4e(γ′) ≥ 1/2, where γ and
γ′ are propositional gambles. A propositional gamble has the form
a1ϕ1+ · · ·+akϕk, where a1, . . . , ak are real numbers and ϕ1, . . . , ϕk are
propositional formulas. This propositional gamble is interpreted as the
gamble a1X[[ϕ1]]+ · · ·+ akX[[ϕk]], where [[ϕj ]] is the set of worlds where ϕ
is true. Thus, a propositional gamble such as 2ϕ+3ψ is interpreted as
the gamble 2X[[ϕ]]+3X[[ψ]], which returns 5 in worlds where both ϕ and
ψ are true, 2 in worlds where ϕ∧¬ψ is true, and so on. Again, different
interpretations of e are allowed; it can be interpreted as probabilistic
expectation, expected belief (see [Halpern 2003] for a definition of ex-
pected belief), or lower expectation (in which case upper expectation
can be defined in the obvious way).
The axioms of the logics depend on the interpretation of l and e. In all
cases, there is an elegant sound and complete axiomatization. In the
case of lower and upper probabilities (resp., lower and upper expec-
tations), not surprisingly, the key axioms are those corresponding to
the properties described in Theorem 3.1 (resp., Theorem 6.6). More-
over, not only are the logics decidable, but the satisfiability problem is
NP-complete in all cases, the same as that of propositional logic (and
of the logic for reasoning about probability). Reasoning about lower
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and upper probability (resp., expectation) is thus, in a precise sense,
no more difficult than propositional reasoning.
• Bayesian networks provide a compact way of representing probability
measures, taking advantage of independencies and conditional inde-
pendencies. There has been a great deal of work in the AI community
showing how Bayesian networks can be used for efficient probabilistic
reasoning (see [Pearl 1988] for an overview). We can define what it
means for U and V to be conditionally independent with respect to a
set P of probability measures. Roughly speaking, U and V are inde-
pendent with respect to P if µ(V | U) = µ(V ) for all µ ∈ P (special
care must be taken to deal with the case that µ(U) = 0; see [Halpern
2001] for details). Conditional independence is defined in the same
way. Once we do this, then the whole technology of Bayesian networks
can be applied to sets of probabilities, essentially without change; see
[Halpern 2001] for details.
As this discussion shows, using sets of probabilities provides a flexible
way of representing uncertainty that enables an agent to represent ignorance
as well as likelihood, while still retaining many of the pleasant features of
using just a single probability measure to represent uncertainty.
Acknowledgments: Thanks to Franz Huber for a careful reading of the
paper and useful comments.
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